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TAXATION OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS TO A DIVORCED
SPOUSE UNDER PRIVATE AGREEMENT*
DIVORCE or legal separation usually requires the husband to make payments
for the support of the wife.1 Payments may be in the form of court decreed
alimony or contractual obligations under a private agreement between the
parties.2 Before 1942 such payments were not taxed to the wife.8 And the
husband could not deduct them,4 although in some states judicious use of
the trust device actually permitted tax results similar to a deduction.5 But
this treatment seemed inequitable: wives received tax-free windfalls; hus-
bands could not deduct a burdensome expense ;0 and variations in state law
allowed only some husbands to manipulate the trust device for tax benefits.7
To achieve fairness 8 and tax uniformity,0 Congress in 1942 added two
sections to the Internal Revenue Code.' 0 Section 22(k) now requires the
wife to include in her gross income periodic payments, received subsequent
*Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Smith v. Commissioner, 192
F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1951).
1. 2 VEIER, AMEcAN FAMILY LAWs 259 et seq. (1931).
2. For advantages of making an agreement rather than letting the court decree ali-
mony, see Miller, Income and Divorce, 28 TAXEs 1233, 1234 (1950); Gruneberg, The
Taxability of Alintwny Payments Under Divorce or Separation Agreements, 17 U. KAN.
Clry L. REV. 52, 61 (1948).
3. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) (alimony); Jane T. Coates, 3 B.T.A. 429
(1926) (payments made by private agreement). The tax statutes did not deal specifically
with the treatment of alimony.
4. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 154 (1917). See also Hearings before Con-
nmittee on Ways and Means on H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess, 92 (1942).
5. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942) ; Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69
(1940). For a detailed discussion see Gornick, Alimony and the Income Tax, 29 CotNULL
L.Q. 28, 29-33 (1943).
6. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 92.
7. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942). See also Gornick, supra note
5, at 34, 35.
8. According to the House report, § 22(k) was added " . . in order to provide...
a new income tax treatment for payments in the nature of or in lieu of alimony or an
allowance for support as between divorced or legally separated spouses. These amend-
ments are intended to treat such payments as income to the spouse actually receiving or
actually entitled to receive them and to relieve the other spouse from the tax burden upon
whatever the amount of such payments is under present law includible in his gross In-
come." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1942).
9. See SLN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942).
10. INT. Ray. CODE §§22(k), 23(u).
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to a divorce or separation decree,"1 "in discharge of . . . a legal obligation
which, because of the marital . . . relationship, is imposed upon or incurred
by [the] husband 12 under such decree or under a written instrument incident
to such divorce or separation. .... -13 Section 23(u) allows the husband to
deduct payments taxed to the wife under 22(k). 14
Alimony is clearly taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband under
the statute. But payments made under private agreements encounter difliculty
11. A court order to make payments set by private agreement is not a decree within
the meaning of the statute. Terrell v. Commissioner, 179 F,2d 833 (7th Cir.), cert. den icd,
340 U.S. 822 (1950). But a foreign decree is sufficient, even though the state in which
the parties are domiciled does not recognize the legality of the foreign divorce. G.C.M.
25250, 1947-2 Cu . Buu.. 32; Feinberg v. Commissioner, 4 P-H 1952 FED. TAx SERV.
72,573 (3d Cir. 1952).
Payments under an informal separation, however, are under no circumstances ta.ed
to the wife, even when the religious beliefs of the parties prevent them from obtaining a
decree. Charles L Brown, 7 T.C. 715 (1946); Max D. Melville, 8 T.C.M. 934 (1949).
Such a policy was adopted to prevent tax evasion effected by splitting income under a
bogus separation. See Smith v. Commissioner, 16S F.2d 446, 44S (2d Cir. 1943). But all
married couples can now split income under the Code. ITT. Rnv. CoDE § 12 (d). And when
an antagonistic wife refuses to sign the necessary joint return, her estranged husband is
taxed more heavily than a husband who can split income. Taxing the wife for payments
received under informal separation would encourage the wife to sign the return and would
also reduce the husband's burden if she refused. See 47 Micia. I REv. 726 (1949).
12. For purposes of the alimony tax, the terms "husband" and "wife" are inter-
changeable. INT. Rm. CooE § 3797(a) (17). But unlike the husband, the wife has no com-
mon law obligation to support. And in only nine states do statutes provide for awarding
the husband alimony. ILLiois CODE c. 40, § 19 (Smith-Hurd, 1934) ; IovA,,, Covz § 598.14
(1949) ; MA.ss. LAws c. 208, § 34 (1933) ; N. D. REv. CODE § 14-0524 (1943) ; N. H. Rnv.
STAT. c. 339, § 19 (1942) ; OHio GENEm. COD § 8003-17 (Page, Supp. 1951) ; Orx.
STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (193S); Om. Comy. IAws § 9-914(3) (1940); WASH. Rnv. STAT.
§ 989 (Remington, 1932).
Payments made for the support of minor children are not taxed to the wife if specifi-
cally set apart by the marital settlement. INT. Rnv. CoDE § 22(k) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§29.22(k)-l(d) (1948); Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946). But ef. Robert K. Mc-
Berty, 16 T.C. 968 (1951). For general discussion see 1 P-H 1952 Fmo. TAx. Smv.
f17863 (1952).
13. INT. REV. Coon § 22(k). For general discussion of the statutory requirements,
see 1 MulERss, LAw oF FEDEEAL Ixoom, TAxAT0io (Supp. 1951) 105-125; Gornick,
Alirony and the Income Tax, 29 CoPaqELL LQ. 28 (1943) ; Gregory, Tax Corsequences
of Marriage and Divorce, 3 Aax. I- REv. 292 (1949) ; Gruneberg, The Taxability of Ali-
many Payments under Divorce or Separation Agreent1s, 17 U. KAmx. CT L REv. 52
(1948); Howard, Divorce and Taxes, 8 ALA. LAWYER 333 (1947); Kramer, Alhmony
and tie Tax Law, 26 TAXES 1105 (1948); Lasser, The Tax Situatios oss Alimony Pal-
imts, 88 J. AccouNTAxcY 396 (1949); Miller, Incom a,.d Dkorce, 23 TAXEs 1233
(1950) ; Rudick, Marriage, Divorce, and Taxes, 2 T,%x L. REv. 123 (1947).
14. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (u).
Other sections of the Code dealing with alimony are § 171 (alimony trust payments
taxed to wife), §162(b)(alimony payments deductible by trust or estate), §312(b)
(estate tax), and § 1002 (gift tax). See also Vonderheit, Income-Tax and Gilt-Tax
Aspects of Di#orce, 31 O.. L REv. 1 (1951).
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in meeting two of the statutory requirements: that there be a "legal obliga-
tion"; and that the instrument be "incident to" divorce.10 Although in the
cases these tests overlap, they are doctrinally distinct and their separation
simplifies analysis.
The broad "legal obligation" language of the statute would seem to require
nothing more than a binding contractual agreement.', But courts, interpreting
Congress' intent, held that the obligation to pay must be undertaken while
there is a "legal obligation to support."'1 Such a requirement was easily ful-
filled by agreements made prior to divorce because a husband always has an
obligation to support his wife during marriage.' 8 On the other hand, since
a divorce decree which neither awards alimony nor incorporates an agree-
ment will almost always terminate the obligation to support,'0 agreements
first conceived after the decree clearly fail to meet the requirement.
But the "legal obligation to support" rationale troubled courts confronted
with post-divorce revisions of agreements originally executed prior to the
decree. Since divorce usually terminates the general obligation to support, "0
only a court decree can maintain such an obligation after divorce. Thus in
Commissioner v. Walsh,2 ' where the original agreement was not incorporated
in the divorce decree, the entire amount paid under a revisionary contract
was held not taxable to the wife because the payments did not begin when
the husband had a legal obligation to support.22 And in Commissioner v,
15. As used throughout this note, "divorce" includes "legal separation."
16. The statute embraces ". . . a legal obligation which, because of the marital ...
relationship, is ... incurred by such husband ... under a written instrument. . ." INi,
Rv. CODE § 22(k). (Emphasis added).
17. The Senate report accompanying the Act reads: "This section [22(k)] applies
only where the legal obligation being discharged arises out of the marital . . . relation-
ship in recognition of the general obligation to support. . . ." SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1942). (Emphasis added). For cases dearly demanding a "legal
obligation to support," see Benjamin B. Cox, 10 T.C. 955, 959, 960 (1948), aff'd, 176
F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Murray, 174 F.2d 816, 818 (2d Cir. 1949),
18. 3 VERiER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS 108 et seq. (1931). And a pre-divorce
agreement meets the statutory requirement even where a divorce decree specifying no
alimony has terminated the husband's obligation to support. Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T.C. 700
(1946).
19. When the decree provides no alimony, the divorce court generally cannot later
revive the husband's support obligation by modifying the decree to impose alimony. See
2 VmiN m, AMRicAN FAmmiLY LAws 265 (1931).
20. Ibid.
21. 183 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
22. Actually the court was not so specific in its holding, merely citing a combination
of four facts as rendering the payments non-taxable to the wife: non-incorporation of
original agreement; execution of revision after divorce decree; lack of continuing court
supervision; and express termination of original agreement by revision. Since the first
three factors are all relevant to the non-existence of a legal obligation to support, how-
ever, the decision seems to rest on this ground. Ibid.
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MvrrayY where the original agreement had been incorporated in the divorce
decree but the parties had failed to obtain a new decree embodying their
revision, the court found that the only existing legal obligation to support
stemmed from the original decree. The court taxed the wife for payments
under the revision because they were within the limit of the original settle-
ment.24 But the court suggested that if the revision had increased payments,
the increment would have been barred as exceeding the existing legal obli-
gation.25 Only if the original agreement were embodied in the divorce decree
and the parties secured a modifying decree incorporating a revision would
the wife be taxed on increased payments.20
This approach produced unwarranted discrimination among revisions de-
signed to meet changed financial circumstances. By procuring a modifying
decree, the parties could revise either alimony or payments made under an
original agreement incorporated in a decree without shifting the tax burden.
However, where the parties attempted a similar revision but failed or were
unable to secure a modifying decree, the husband incurred the risk of bear-
ing the tax burden on any increase or of losing his deduction for the full
amount of post-revision payments.
A recent decision by the First Circuit, Smith vi. Co ;mmissioncr,2 suggests
an end to this discrimination by a broadened interpretation of "legal obli-
gation." In the Smith case the divorce decree incorporated an agreement.P
And by a later agreement the parties revised payments and expressly termi-
nated the original. Although they secured a new court decree ending the
obligation imposed by the decree of divorce, they failed to have the revision
included in the modifying decree.2 9 Thus technically there was no "legal
obligation to support" at the time of the revision. 30 Yet the court affirmed
the Tax Court's holding that the revised payments were taxable to the wife
under Section 22(k).31 The implication of the decision is clear: any revision
23. 174 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1949).
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 818.
26. Ibid. See also Gale v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951) (increased ali-
mony under modifying decree taxed to wife).
27. 192 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1951).
28. Id. at 842.
29. Incorporation of an agreement in a modifying decree would give the divorce
court continuing power of supervision over the parties. But since the First Circuit ac-
cepted the petitioner's view that following the revision there was only a contractual
obligation, it apparently recognized that the divorce court had not incorporated the re-
vision and no longer had such power. Ibid.
30. See p. 1200 supra.
31. Smith v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1951). For the Tax Court
opinion, see Dorothy Briggs Smith, 16 T.C. 639 (1951).
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will satisfy the "legal obligation" requirement if the original agreement was
executed while a legal obligation to support existed. 2
Assuming that the "legal obligation" requirement is met, an agreement
must also qualify as "incident to" divorce in order to be taxed to the wife
under 22(k) . 3 Courts generally have found such "incidence" only where the
agreement is executed "prior [to] or coincident [with]" the decree.84 By
definition, an agreement incorporated in the decree satisfies this requirement
whereas one originally conceived after the decree just as clearly fails to meet
it. But where agreements made prior to divorce were revised after the decree
and such revision was not incorporated in a modifying decree, early opinions
denied Section 22(k) tax treatment. 35 Since not made "prior to or coincident
with" the divorce decree, revisionary agreements were held not "incident to"
the divorce.86
Recent cases apparently have liberalized the "prior to" test of "incidence."
Although foreshadowed by a 1950 opinion of the Court of Claims,37 the First
Circuit's Smith opinion sets forth most clearly the new approach. In effect,
revisionary agreements are given the same status as the original. So long as
the original agreement can qualify as "prior to or coincident with" the divorce,
the revision can also qualify.
38
. But even where an agreement had been executed "prior to" the decree, it
had to pass a further obstacle before it could be held "incident to" the divorce:
32. The First Circuit remarked that "[t]he genesis of the [original] and [revision-
ary] agreements was the same-a satisfaction by the husband of his marital obligation
... " and that "[the origin or motive for the [revisionary] agreement can be traced
to no obligation other than one arising from a ... marital relationship." Smith v. Com-
missioner, 192 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1951).
33. INr. REv. CODE §22(k).
34. Benjamin B. Cox, 10 T.C. 955, 958 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949).
Cf. Commissioner v. Walsh, 183 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
35. Commissioner v. Walsh, 183 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Commissioner v. Mur-
ray, 174 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1949).
36. Natalia D. Murray, 7 T.C.M. 365 (1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1949). Cl.
Commissioner v. Walsh, 183 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
37. Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl.), cert. dnied, 339 U.S. 978
(1950). See also Helen Scott Fairbanks, 15 T.C. 62 (1950).
38. "[S]ince the [original] agreement was incident to the divorce decree . . . the
[revisionary] agreement was also incident thereto." Smith v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d
841, 844 (1st Cir. 1951).
The court refused to be influenced by the fact that the revision expressly terminated
and cancelled the original agreement. Previously, agreements containing such termination
provisions had been treated as new agreements. See Walsh v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d
803 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Commissioner v. Murray, 174 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1949). The Ssilh
view is more realistic. A revision performs the same function as its original, and termi-
nation or cancellation provisions merely reflect the husband's desire not to become liable
for payments under both instruments at the same time.
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the parties must have mutually contemplated divorce when they executed it.-9
Although nothing in the statute suggests this requirement, a questionable
reading of the Senate report accompanying the 1942 Act apparently led courts
to this conclusion.40
The contemplation requirement has proved unsatisfactory. In view of the
Congressional purpose to tax to the wife all payments "in lieu of alimony,"41
only the function of the payment seems relevant. But agreements initially
intended only to cover informal separation were excluded by the contemplation
requirement even though they were later used by the divorce court in lieu of
prescribing alimony.42 Moreover, even where the parties actually had con-
templated divorce, they faced a difficult problem of proof. What would prob-
ably constitute the best evidence of an intent to divorce-the inclusion of a
statement to such effect in the agreement-was often omitted for fear of a
collusion charge which might void the agreement or bar the divorce.ra So
taxpayers often needed circumstantial evidence 4  to prove a mutual state of
39. See, e.g., Robert Vood Johnson, 10 T.C. 647 (1948). The parties were required
to have intended divorce or legal separation and to have drafted the agreement for that
reason. The fact that they contemplated a different decree than the one finally entered did
not mean that the agreement was not "incident." Jessie L Fry, 13 T.C. 658, 661 (1949) ;
George T. Brady, 10 T.C. 1192, 1198 (1948). But there had to be more than the mere
recognition of the "... possibility of divorce at some unspecified time." Joseph L. Lerner,
15 T.C. 379, 386 (1950), rev'd, 195 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1952).
At first both parties had to mutually contemplate divorce. Robert Wood Johnson,
supra. But the Second Circuit later decided that only one party need contemplate it.
Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952), revmrsing Estate of Daniel G.
Reid, 15 T.C. 573 (1950).
40. The relevant language reads: "This section [22(k)] does not apply to that part
of any periodic payment attributable to any interest in the property so transferred,
which interest originally belonged to the wife, unless she received it from her husband
in contemplation of or as an incident to the divorce or separation without ... adequate
consideration. . . , other than the release of the husband or his property from marital
obligations." SzN. R.. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1942). (Emphasis added).
The purpose of this section was highly restrictive-to prevent taxing the wife under
§22(k) for income from her joint interest in property which she had not acquired as
part of the marital settlement. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(k)-l(b) (1948).
41. Section 22(k) was added to provide ". . . a new income tax treatment for pay-
ments in the nature of or in lieu of alimony or an allowance for support." H.IL RE.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1942).
42. Cecil A. Miller, 16 T.C. 1010 (1951) ; Joseph C. Brightbill, S T.C.M. 112, aff'd,
178 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949).
43. See, e.g., Robert Wood Johnson, 10 T.C. 647, 653 (1943); Bertram G. Zilmer,
16 T.C. 365, 366 (1951) ; George T. Brady, 10 T.C. 1192, 1197, 1193 (1948).
Actually, such a fear is based on questionable interpretation of the case law. The
general rule is that a bona fide settlement regarding alimony, although it contemplates
divorce, is not collusive if it does not induce procurement of the divorce. McCauley v. Me-
Cauley, 88 N.J. Eq. 392, 103 At. 20 (1918) ; Allen v. Allen, 111 Fla. 733, 10 Sv,. 237 (1933).
44. The courts have used the following facts, either singly or in combination with
each other: letters written during negotiation, Robert Wood Johnson, 10 T.C. 647 (1948),
19521 1203
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
mind which had existed many years before. 45 And although few courts
actually failed to find the requisite contemplation,46 the factual nature of the
problem begot constant litigation.
47
Recently, however, in Lerner v. Commissioner,48 the Second Circuit re-
jected the contemplation test.49 A pre-divorce agreement called for annual
payments to the wife during her lifetime. The decree neither incorporated
the agreement nor provided alimony. 0 And, in addition, there was insufficient
evidence that the parties had contemplated divorce.r 1 The Tax Court had
refused to allow the husband the Section 23(u) deduction on the ground
that divorce had not been mutually contemplated.52 But, in reversing, the
Second Circuit declared that payments pursuant to an agreement would re-
place alimony-and comply with Congresional intent-if, first, the agreement
survived divorce5 13 and, second, the divorce court had used the payments to
replace alimony. 4 The court did not say whether both findings are necessary
for Section 22(k) tax treatment. 5
George T. Brady, 10 T.C. 1192 (1948); discussions between the parties, Robert Wood
Johnson, seupra, Floyd W. Jefferson, 13 T.C. 1092 (1949), Charles Campbell, 15 T.C. 355
(1950); wording of the agreement, George T. Brady, supra; short period elapsed be-
tween execution of agreement and procurement of divorce, Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T.C. 70D
(1946) ; same attorney represented party in negotiation of agreement and in divorce pro-
ceedings, ibid.
45. See, e.g., Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952) (31 years);
Robert Wood Johnson, 10 T.C. 647 (1948) (19 years); Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T.C. 700
(1946) (12 years).
46. Only three reported cases fell. Cecil A. Miller, 16 T.C. 1010 (1951) ; Joseph C.
Brightbill, 8 T.C.M. 112, aff'd, 178 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Estate of Daniel G. Reid,
15 T.C. 573 (1950), rev'd sub norn., Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 625 (2d Cir.
1952).
47. Approximately thirty reported cases were decided under the contemplation theory.
48. 195 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1952).
49. "[Payments] should not be be denied effect under the statute merely because
there is no evidence that divorce and settlement were contemporaneously planned and
carried out." Id. at 298.
50. Id. at 297.
51. Id. at 298.
52. Joseph L. Lerner, 15 T.C. 379 (1950).
53. Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1952).
54. Ibid. Had the court desired to keep the "contemplation" test, it might have based
its decision on Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952). This opinion,
which had come down after the Tax Court opinion in the Lerner case, had already
broadened the contemplation requirement by holding that contemplation by one party,
not mutual contemplation, was all that was required. Although there was some evidence
that one party had contemplated divorce in the Lerner case and the petitioner's counsel
argued the Izrastzoff rationale, see Reply Brief for Petitioner, the court apparently felt
that even this approach was unduly narrow and troublesome. Lerner v. Commissioner,




Acceptance by other courts of the Snith and Lerner approach should
effect a desirable expansion of the "incidence" requirement of Section 22(k).rG
Smith will tax to the wife payments made under any post-divorce revision
if the agreement which is revised was "incident to" divorce. And Lerner
will make any pre-divorce agreement "incident" without regard to the original
intent of the parties if payments under the agreement replace alimony.
56. The Third Circuit has already e-pressed its approval of Lerner and held an agree-
ment "incident" under the Lener rationale. Feinberg v. Commissioner, 4 P-H 1952 FED.
TAX Sav. ff 72,573 (3d Cir. 1952), reversing 16 T.C. 1485 (1951).
The Tax Court, however, recently held an agreement not "incident" on facts which
indicate that the decision is contrary to both Lerner and Feinberg. Florence B. Moses, 18
T.C. No. 128 (1952). The court made an unconvincing attempt to distinguish the almost
identical Feinberg case and distinguished Lerner on the ground that there the divorce court
had "adopted" the agreement "in the divorce proceedings." Ibid. In Lerner, it is true, the
divorce referee referred to the agreement. Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 296, 297 (2d
Cir. 1952). But the Second Circuit's rationale was much broader. It relied not on adoption
by the divorce court but on "the fact that the substance of the decree was geared to [the
agreement's] continuing in force in lieu of prescribed alimony .... " Id. at 299. Thus Lerner
would seem to apply to any case in which no alimony is awarded. It is clear from language
in the Moses opinion that the Tax Court is reluctant to abandon the contemplation test.
But in view of the Lerner and Fcisberg opinions, there is a strong possibility that the
decision will be appealed and reversed.
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